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Revised Diagnostic Profile 2016:  Revisions, rationale and further thoughts. 
Viviane Green and Angela Joyce 
 
Abstract:  In 2001, a working party at the Anna Freud Centre undertook the task of 
looking at Anna Freud's original Provision Diagnostic Profile and seeing if, in the light 
of current knowledge, modifications should be made.  A broad view of the mind as a 
complex dynamic system sculpted out of biopsychosocial forces underpins the chapter 
with reference to allied disciplines and research.  The chapter considers the rationale for 
adding certain features and highlighting and/or reframing others.  In shifting the 
emphases from the original drive theory perspective to an explicitly object relational 
one the authors acknowledge the altered metapsychology whilst arguing that the 
revisions preserve the original psychoanalytic and developmental template, including 
the importance of the psychosexual organisation.  The authors offer their suggestions to 
the question in 2015 would yet further revisions need to be made and if so which.  The 
working party reconvened in 2016 to further revise the Provisional Diagnostic Profile. 
 
 
Introduction  
Anna Freud’s original Profile was rooted in the multiple aspects of classical psychoanalysis: 
the structural, dynamic, economic, genetic and adaptive aspects and yet, it seemed to a group 
of us at the Anna Freud Centre in the late 1990’s, that the range and balance of factors that 
wrought the developmental changes from infancy to the close of adolescence now required a 
diagnostic Profile that could be more finely tuned.  In 1999/2000  the authors (together with 
two other members of staff, Duncan McLean and Jenny Davids) held a series of meetings to 
consider whether the original diagnostic profile needed revision in  the light of more 
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contemporary findings and understanding of child development.  Whilst there was ready 
agreement that updating was needed, a thornier set of questions revolved around tensions 
which ensued if, for instance, the original psychosexual organisation as the ‘spine’ of 
metapsychology (and inherent in the original profile) gave way to another organising 
principle such as object relations.  Yet, we still adhered to a profoundly developmental model 
where the biopsychosocial changes, evident in that evolution from infancy to adolescence, 
heralded qualitatively different concerns at different levels of psychic functioning. 
 
In the course of our discussions, it became clear that we wanted to incorporate a number of 
features which had previously only been implicit or had not yet entered the stage.  In singling 
out some of these features such as safety seeking, we drew on research findings from the 
child developmentalists, neuroscience and attachment theory and research.  There are 
different (although not necessarily mutually exclusive) overarching accounts of the basic 
forces that underpin and propel development.  After much debate, we arrived at a consensus 
that we would need to incorporate an emerging complex model of the mind where it is 
conceived of as a multi modular system designed to manage a wide range of biopsychological 
motivations (Green, 2003).  This was also to include a broader cultural view of the social as a 
major motivator in and context for development; ‘To privilege one or two systems whilst 
demoting others would be to ignore the current state of knowledge and to offer a narrow view 
of psychic organisation predicated on a limited number of possibilities’ (Green, 2003, p 6).  
We use the term ‘biopsychosocial’ to reflect a holistic view of the mind, but given that this is 
a psychoanalytic investigation, the accent remains on the psychosocial, whilst at the same 
time retaining and enhancing the place of the body in the child’s mind and functioning.  At 
the same time as we wanted to retain a fundamentally psychoanalytic perspective, we 
nonetheless took the view that findings from other disciplines such as neuroscience, have 
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great relevance.  This reflected the changes that had taken place within the discipline of 
psychoanalysis over the previous four decades, with the plurality of perspectives that have 
been commented upon by many theoreticians in the field.  It seemed inevitable that any 
revision was going to be seen as unfortunate or a challenge to much valued earlier thinking 
by those of a more tradiotnalist inclination.  We recognise this, but at the same time, maintain 
the merit of such a revision which seeks to keep the spirit of the original whilst incorporating 
material that was not so available then. 
 
Much of the revised Profile involves a rearrangement of the original Profile written by Anna 
Freud and her colleagues, but in this rearrangement, different emphases emerge giving 
greater prominence to both the real and internal object relations (Section V. Psychic 
Development, A. Object Relations).  Greater importance is accorded to the nature of the 
family on which the child depends and in particular qualitative aspects of the emotional 
‘environment’ afforded by the parents or caregivers (Sections 1. Family Constellation).  
Greater attention is drawn to the need for safety, ongoing age appropriate scaffolding across a 
range of capacities including the regulation of anxiety and other affects.  The original Profile 
already reminded the diagnostician that there were many different aspects of the child’s 
functioning which needed to be taken into account.  We did not alter this radically, but 
updated some of the overarching capacities in the light of research.  Thus, for example, 
‘Theory of mind’ was seen as a very useful way of clustering a range of object relational 
capacities indicating the child’s capacities to understand others as separate people. (Section 
V. Psychic Development, D. Ego Development subsection 9). 
 
When attempting a psychoanalytic formulation, a developmental perspective is a vital tool 
and as such, the updated profile retains much of the kernel of the original.  It is hard to 
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imagine a psychoanalytic formulation that does not include developmental components; 
without these it would become a symptom-diagnosis, but without reference to any of the 
moorings that enable meanings to be attributed and understanding to unfold.  Classically, this 
developmental perspective included the notions of fixations and regressions, linked to the 
theory of psychosexual stages.  In this revision these have slipped out of focus as the 
metapsychology was modified, but are implicitly included in the Diagnostic Statement at the 
end where the writer is asked to give a “dynamic understanding of the child’s presenting 
problems and psychopathology”. 
 
Another danger in failing to take account of all the complexities of a child's particular 
developmental story, is that the final formulation may derive only from one small section of 
theory e.g. the oedipal phase, so that a part of the disturbance may then be mistaken for the 
whole and this was recognised in the original  elaboration of the Profile.  Finally, we retained 
the original principle that a Profile needed to incorporate the child’s subjective experience 
with a view of the child from the outside, drawing on a variety of accounts. 
 
General considerations 
The revised Profile opens with a statement of general principles to be adhered to when 
writing the Profile.  Although the new organisation adapts the classical Structural Model of 
Sigmund Freud to take account of changing views of the balance of salient factors, these 
general principles remain true to Anna Freud’s thinking.  So for example, the contrast in 
understanding pathology between a deficit in functioning and the result of psychic conflict is 
held to be fundamental, although their possible and/or probable coexistence is recognised. 
The latter seems particularly important in the light of current knowledge about the 
experience-dependent nature of  development.  Equally, the notion of appropriate 
5 
 
developmental status at any particular age is implicit in any assessment, and Anna Freud’s 
dictum of understanding what is normative in order to gauge the pathological is retained.  In 
the original Profile, the concept of developmental lines, indicating the normative trajectory of 
development along particular lines was explicit; in this revision the diagnostitian is enjoined 
always to take into account the age appropriateness of a child’s functioning.  The 
developmental lines were assumed to retain their relevance; so too was the assessment of the 
overall balance of progressive versus regressive forces.  The writer is encouraged to make 
and develop inferences and to back these by evidence from the diagnostic clinical process. 
Writers are asked to be succinct and not to necessarily follow the template slavishly, but to 
use what is applicable to the child and in so doing to creatively use their own views.  
Hypothesising is also encouraged, to think outside given understanding, promoting a creative 
and imaginative approach to diagnosing. 
 
I. Family constellation, II. The Referral and III. Description of the child. 
Although the earlier Profile included space for the family of the child, here it begins the 
discussion. Furthermore, not only is the detailed family constellation with its history etc. 
required, but also as full an account as possible of the family’s social and cultural context, 
including race, religion, education, class, place of birth etc.  This locates the ultimate 
intrapsychic understanding of the child firmly within a psycho-social and cultural setting, 
facilitating a complexity of meaning of the metapsychology that is the cornerstone of the 
Profile.  Thus, when it proceeds to the referral, not only are the details of what is causing 
worry important, but already this can be contextualised by the previous section.  For instance 
assessing a child referred with stealing as part of the referral from a school in a disadvantaged 
neighbourhood with a high crime rate would have to take this into account differently than a 
similar child from a prosperous community. 
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‘The Description of the child’ now incorporates not only the impressions of the referrer and 
the family, teachers, including any contradictions, discrepancies etc., but also the 
diagnostician’s responses to meeting the child, using their counter-responses, 
countertransferences, as possible ‘evidence’ to take note of in the assessment.  The purpose of 
this is to bring in the idea of disciplined consideration of potential unconscious 
communications from the child by the clinician to contribute to the diagnosis. 
 
IV. Environmental Factors  
The original Profile already emphasised the importance of the environment in which the child 
developed.  From the outset, the Profile provided a rich multi-perspective way of thinking 
about the shaping of a child’s internal world in the context of various ‘environmental’ forces.  
The impact of significant events such as losses, separations from caregivers, divorce, 
hospitalisations etc. were all considered in the light of the child’s age and stage of 
development.  In the revised Profile, the terms of reference as to what constituted the 
‘environment’ were broadened to ‘formulate the nature of the family system in which the 
child is growing up, and in turn, the place of the family in its community and cultural 
context.’  In drawing attention to the family system, there is an implicit acknowledgment that 
children are growing up within many different family forms including non traditional family 
arrangements.  Divorce, separation, the rise of the reconstituted family, same sex parenting 
are just some of the possibilities. 
 
This explicitly psychosocial perspective encourages the diagnostician to consider the family 
as a culturally embedded system.  To some extent, this reflects how changing socio-cultural 
demographics requires a more fine grained approach to considering specific implicit and 
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explicit values within a particular group and the broader community to which the family 
belongs.  The power of family secrets has long been known.  Perhaps this can now be 
widened to encompass experiences that can or cannot be spoken about not because they are 
personal secrets, but because they are part of a psychosocial unconscious in that they remain 
unarticulated within the broader culture. 
 
The relational ‘environment’ is not only emphasised, but situates the child’s intimate 
relationships at the heart of the his/her development.  Also noted, is the need to consider the 
impact of intergenerational trauma as it is transmitted within the child’s immediate family.  If 
psychic life iand the mind is rooted in embodied experience (Seigal, 1999) then what is 
‘sculpted’ is mediated through those earliest  relationships.  This underscores  the statement 
that ‘Possible correlations between the child’s life development and parental character / 
pathology should be noted.  The parents’ functioning as adults in their own right. is also of 
significance.’  The parents’ functioning as a parental couple (whether together or not) is an 
integral part of the assessment. The revisions invite the diagnostician to comment in more 
detail on the parents as a couple and individuals 
 
V. Psychic Development  
As previously stated, the heart of the Profile here revises Freud’s metapsycholgy that framed 
the original. Whilst retaining many of its features, they are rearranged, and broadened and 
written in different terminology, reflecting a different interpretation of their significance and 
place in describing the functioning of a child.  We recognise that this inevitably raises the 
problems of plurality and eclecticism addressed in the introduction. 
 
A. Object Relations 
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This section is the heart of the Profile, reflecting the turn of the century consensus that the 
development of mind and the personality and character of a person arises from within the 
crucible of the human relationships and their representation in the inner world of the subject.  
The intersubjective matrix shapes the constitutional givens (biological genetic inheritance 
about which much more is now known) and in turn is shaped by them.  Genetic research 
emphasises the impact of the environment on the expression of genes such that good enough 
or adverse relational environments have been shown to affect developmental outcomes of 
constitutional givens, for good or ill (Pretorius, 2010).  Thus, it is widely held that a child 
with a good genetic inheritance will do worse developmentally in a poor relational 
environment, than a child not so well endowed, in a rich relational environment (Music, 
2011).  Good experiences have been shown to mitigate genetic propensities and bad early 
experiences to reinforce them.  Treating children badly affects them, but not all children are 
similarly affected by the same treatment (Caspi, McClay, Moffitt, Mill, Martin, Craig, Taylor 
& Poulton, 2002).  This is mediated by their genetic inheritance.  In addition, the quality of 
attachment that develops between a baby and his parents mediates the expression of genetic 
inheritance, such that during development, there may be different outcomes to the presence of 
genetic markers depending on the security or otherwise of attachment (Fearon, Shmueli-
Goetz, Viding, Fonagy & Plomin, 2014).  What is clear, is that the interaction between 
genetic predispositions and sustained, stress-inducing experiences early in life can lay 
unstable foundations for mental and physical health that endures well into childhood and 
beyond. 
 
The original Profile, with its ‘staged’ approach to development, offered a caution against the 
reductionism in attributing all disturbances to one period. e.g.  the very earliest relationship.  
Whilst this is  known to have  powerful effects reverberating across the lifespan, nonetheless, 
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disturbances can also emerge at later pivotal stages on the basis of good enough early 
experience.  We were keen to preserve this flexibilbity in considering ‘valency’ of a specific 
stage, and it is here that the classical concepts of fixation and regression also have their place. 
 
The diagnostician is urged to consider both the subjective and the more “objective” aspects of 
the child’s experiences of their relationships.  Thus, the section starts with the outward, 
behavioural manifestations of the child’s relating to others: family, friends, teachers, the 
people involved in the assessment process etc.  Then the quality of attachment is to be 
gauged, with the reminder that this is a representation of the properties of relationships, not 
an intrapsychic state  in the classical sense. Relationships are dynamically understood as at 
once the  formative shapers of an internal representional  world and  an expression of the 
internal representations    
 
The next section emphasises a fundamental aspect of attachment theory, the sense of safety in 
object relations, which in the original Profile would have been dealt with in the sections on 
anxiety and defence.  Attachment theory and research directly influenced our highlighting the 
importance of safety and a way of understanding more systematically, the strategies and 
adaptations the child has to make in the face of lack of safety in their relationships with 
significant others.  Including this here, also may influence what the diagnostician observes in 
the clinical process such as the ways in which the child and its caregivers separate and come 
back together in the waiting room when the diagnostic sessions are taking place.  Is there a 
sense that the child can turn to its parent(s) when anxious, fearful etc. or is there an 
inappropriate, perhaps precocious independence?  Is the child afraid of the parents? The sense 
of safety in the child’s relationships has proved to be of great significance for development, 
which is reflected in the way it is privileged here. 
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It is only at subsection 4, that the clinician is asked to make a judgement about the conscious 
and unconscious representations of the child’s object relations in a more traditional 
psychoanalytic way.  And a complexity of aspects is required: it is not only the thoughts and 
feelings about these psychic objects that might be inferred from the way the child relates to 
the diagnostician and from the content of activities in the clinical process such as play, 
fantasy, direct accounts by the child of their life etc, but also structural aspects such as 
whether the child has moved from dyadic relating to triadic and beyond, implying at an age 
adequate level, some more sophisticated working through of Oedipality.  Is the form of 
manifestations of these representations age appropriate, for instance fantasy play in a young 
child or stories in displacement in a latency-aged child?  The affective tone of these 
representations is also to be noted.  Do the child’s real external relationships lead to the 
creation of states of mind that are troubling, for example is the child fearful of significant 
others, or do they seem to be age appropriately supportive and secure?  How then are the 
internal representations of these object relations structured in the child's mind and then also to 
what extent might the child’s difficulites be thought of as having become internalised? 
 
The final subsection addresses the child’s capacity for object relations. This requires the 
clinician to make a judgement about whether the child's interest in, or cathexis of 
relationships with others lies within the normal range.  If the child is shy is this simply a 
matter of hesitation and some insecurity or is it more serious?  If a child seems to be difficult 
to reach, how is this to be understood?  The child may have severe deficits in relating to 
others and consideration needs to be given as to whether s/he may be on the autistic spectrum 
and requires further specialist assessment.  Alternatively s/he may be an “undrawn child” 
who has suffered much neglect from their caregivers and needs particular therapeutic 
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adaptations to approach this.  There may also be indications that other social agencies need to 
be involved if for example there is evidence of neglect or abuse. 
 
Also significant, is whether the child has the age-appropriate capacity to be alone (Winnicott, 
1958), to be within his/her own skin and not need constant actual contact with others. 
Included in this, consideration might be given to the achievement of object constancy, the 
capacity to hold in mind the absent object despite the range of affective responses to 
separation. This has relevance then for assessing the child’s relationship with himself (in the 
subsequent section on The Self), as well as with others. 
 
This whole section has a very different slant when compared with the original Profile.  The 
revised Profile starts with the assumption that we are fundamentally object seeking whereas 
in the original the drives were the reified engine room of object relating.  Assessing relational 
aspects was largely within the context of the libidinal and aggressive drives and their 
cathexes.  In the original also, the concept of object constancy is given a central position and 
here it is implied, but not spelled out.  The subsection on the capacity for object relations 
does not assume there is a ‘drive’ source in those classical terms which are unintegrated from 
object seeking.  Nonetheless invoking dyadic/triadic/Oedipal levels of development in 
subsection 4 clearly encompasses drive theory.  However there is an implication of a broader 
psychobiological substrate to relating to others. 
 
B. Self Development  
How the child’s self experience is communicated and manifested both consciously and  
unconsciously to others, is the psychodynamic leitmotif which runs throughout all aspects of 
the Profile.  The self has been thought of having a ‘form’ which has emerged within the 
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context of a relationship and Winnicott has been very influential in describing the emerging 
sense of self (Winnicott, 1958/1965). Maybe the idea of a more ‘dynamic’ self engaged in 
qualitatively different relationships reflects contemporary thinking (Stern, 1985; Wright, 
2009).  Whilst the self has a ‘form’, attachment research which demonstrates that a child can 
have qualitatively different attachments with different significant people, suggests a move 
away from a fixed ‘essentialist’ view of self. 
 
This section attempts to engage the diagnostician in the area of the child’s own subjectivity; 
the view from the inside, how does the child feel within their own skin?  What do they think 
and feel about themselves?  How do they represent aspects of the self.  What are the depth 
and range of affects.  At a very ordinary level, this would address what makes the child feel 
happy, sad and what sort of  wishes, hopes or fears do they have about themselves or the 
important people in their lives.  Do any specific feelings about the self dominate?  As with 
other sections these questions need to be understood developmentally i.e. that one would 
expect an increasingly differentiated and complex sense of self and self in relation to others 
to develop with age. 
 
The growing incorporation of a sense of ‘reality’ in relation to appraising the idea of the self  
as a pathway to healthy development is highlighted. For instance the modification to early 
childhood omnipotence/narcissistic grandiosity vs persistence. 
 
We have incorporated the structural superego into this section viewing it as an agency with 
the same questions about the quality of the superego as before but adding in the extent to 
which the child can ‘own’ their behaviour and its impact on others. 
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C. Relationship to bodily self and drives.  
This section perhaps reflects the struggle to maintain more directly, classical drive theory. 
This revision of the Profile reflects a more multiperspective approach to understanding 
development and mental functioning, eschewing a model which can privilege one aspect such 
as the classical psychoanalytic notion of the drives.  However it was felt absolutely necessary 
to retain a section on the body and the child's relationship to his/ her body, including concepts 
such as the stages of infantile sexuality, the expression of aggression in various forms 
including the use of the body.  The bodily self is seen here as a fundamental part of the child's 
sense of him or herself.  Included is not only the child's investment in his body but also 
whether that body is developing well or is disabled in someway.  This was not included in the 
drive section of the original Profile, but in the ego section.  Here it has its own place and by 
implication, of much significance for the child's sense of self.  Also given consideration is the 
possibility of the child's more pathological investment in its body, such as its use through 
psychosomatic illness, self harm as in aggression turned against the self, the failure to take 
appropriate ownership of the body. 
 
There is an implied looser / broader understanding of psychosexuality in considering sexual 
development. The child's gender development is mentioned, which implies also their 
identifications as well as problematic or conflictual aspects of their sense of masculinity or 
femininity.  Explicitly stated is that cross gender identifications are part of normal 
development.  Even since this revised Profile was written attitudes to both object choice and 
gender development have modified.  There is much in western culture now that permits the 
expression of uncertainty and fluidity of movement in terms of changing object choice and 
gender identifications, some eventually leading to a number of outcomes e.g. transsexual 
outcome.  This has yet to be incorporated into the current state of psychoanalytic thinking. 
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More mainstream has been the adaptation of psychoanalytic attitudes to homosexual 
outcomes to development, not always seeing this as pathological but retaining the view that 
all sexual development is the outcome of compromise formations between underlying 
anxieties, conflicting wishes and identifications. 
 
Aggression is given its own subsection in this part that addresses the bodily self. This reflects 
the view that the source of aggression is in the body, and the psyche uses this propensity for 
its various ends. It seeks to place aggression as a significant aspect of the child's functioning, 
modifiable, adaptable and capable of expression in different ways.  There is an explicit 
assumption that aggression is a normal and necessary part of human functioning (a 
psychobiological thrust forward as it were) and a significant part of the child's object 
relations as well as their sense of self.  Pathology in this context would be viewed as the 
continued use of the physical body as an expression of hate and the wish to destroy not being 
being superseded by other age appropriate, and symbolised modes of expression. 
 
D. Ego functions / general development 
This section has preserved many key features singled out by Anna Freud.  Her significant 
contribution to psychoanalysis on the defence organisation remains.  The general assessment 
of the intactness or otherwise, of the ego apparatus continues to be important and given 
advances in understanding of the  many functions which could be subsumed under the term 
ego;  additional  specialist assessments can offer a more sophisticated or complex 
understanding of the child.  Where, for example,  there are difficulties in short term working 
memory the diagnostician will need to offer a view on the balance between deficit and the 
child’s defensive strategies to cover up his deficit and conflicts interfering with memory.  We 
have also kept as a summary consideration the various features which indicates the child’s 
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overall capacities and attitude to development: mastery of anxieties, frustration tolerance and 
progressive vs regressive wishes etc.  We have added here (as well as elsewhere) resilience. 
 
In subsection 3, we have invited the diagnostician to specify further aspects of cognitive 
development by asking more detailed questions about the child’s quality and range of 
thinking, highlighting particular strengths, reflecting the complexity of the child’s mental 
functioning.  This part also asks about the child’s ‘insights’ into himself and others and areas 
linked to interoception and perception of the child’s own and others states.  Germane to this 
is subsection 10 which gathers several of the last aforementioned capacities under Theory of 
Mind (TOM). Where this is absent or attenuated it has proved a very useful way of 
differentiating for instance a child on the autistic spectrum or a child with profound 
narcissistic difficulties. 
 
Threaded throughout the ego section is the question about the child’s orientation to ‘reality’. 
More emphasis has been given to the child’s growing capacity to distinguish between fantasy 
and reality/ pretend and reality as a developmental achievement (subsection 4). 
 
In subsection 6 we expanded the section on play to enlarge understanding of not only the 
child’s capacity to play but the manner in which they do so.  This section not only reflects the 
child’s attitudes and defences (rigid? obsessive?), but draws attention to the qualities of 
playfulness and imagination per se.  We saw this as not only an important part of ongoing 
development but reflecting the significance of play and playing as an indicator of the child’s 
capacity to be a child (Winnicott 1971).  This is an account of childhood that recognises the 
age-adequate presence of play, but also underlines the view that children are not just little 
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adults; they have their own ways of being and play and playing are important modes through 
which this is manifest. 
 
We have added a far greater emphasis on affects: what range of affects is the child able to 
experience?  Does the child recognise, have language for their affects?  How does the child 
experience, manage and express his affects?  What we had in mind was what researchers 
have come to name as affect regulation. 
Superego 
This section has remained as a differentiated structure. Although its development arises from 
the relational matrix and structured thorugh the Oedipal phase it seemed important to 
preserve its increasing differentiation as an autonomous internal influence. We have 
illustrated some of its features to include its benign aspects 
 
 
VI. Diagnostic Statement  
The following section in the original Profile, including the genetic assessments (fixation 
points, regressions arrests) and the dynamic and structural assessments and level of maturity, 
has been largely omitted from this revision.  Nontheless, those considerations remain 
essential elements of diagnostic thinking in the application of the revised Profile. Perhaps it is 
an expression of the difficulties the revisers of the Profile had in adapting explicitly these 
elements of the original  instrument to the plurality of contemporary thinking.  The language 
of these assessments certainly contain classical thinking to a degree, but carry the broader 
developmental frames of reference that have been fully embraced in this revision.  In 
classical terms drive theory was the fundamental model underpinning all the other 
considerations, but in this revision the authors have written in a more general way about the 
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diagnostic formulation of these phenomena nevertheless occurring in ways that are more 
explainable within this more multiperspective model.  The diagnostician is required to write 
the formulation under four broad headings and to include in the narrative both a broad and 
deep account of the developmental status of the child in its psychosocialbiological setting, 
which then gives substance to the recommendation for therapeutic intervention (or not) in the 
last section. 
 
Recommendations 
This section does not confine itself to a recommendation (or otherwise) for psychoanalytic 
treatment but also requires the diagnostician to consider other forms of intervention such as 
family therapy, or psychiatric treatment, depending upon the diagnostic formulation. 
Additionally a number of interventions might be recommended coincidentally if this is 
thought to be appropriate.  The ideal recommendation is to be made but then consideration of 
the likelihood of its acceptability by the parents or the referring agency have to be taken into 
account in making a realistic proposal for effective responsiveness to the child’s predicament. 
 
2015:  Some thought on possible further revisions:  Plus ça change?    
In some respects the foundational principles of the revised Profile are finding a contemporary 
iteration.  As Midgley (2011) points out, atheoretical and symptom-based taxonomies to 
mental health assessment are increasingly seen as of limited value.  Taking a broad multi 
perpective approach Luyten, Blatt, van Houdenhove & Corveleyn (2006) argue,  ‘findings 
from a wide variety of fields, including psychiatric genetics, neurobiology, developmental 
psychopathology, cognitive, psychodynamic, social and personality psychology [which] 
converge to suggest that [mental health difficulties] can be best understood in the context of 
an etiologically based, dynamic interactionism model” (p.991). 
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From a psychoanalytic perspective this also fits in with the plurality of models that have 
proliferated since the mid twentieth century. However, in psychoanalytic theory the concept 
of the dynamic unconscious remains its cornerstone and a central question in appraising this 
Profile as an instrument of psychoanalytic assessment has to be whether this new incarnation 
retains that concept sufficiently.  The incorporation of new material inevitably alters the 
frame and challenges the previous apparently more coherent metapsychology.  Extending the 
boundaries of knowledge can be at the expense of coherence and in particular here it might be 
said that questions about the nature and understanding of the unconscious, both dynamic and 
descriptive are implicitly raised.  In a cross discipline arena the notion of the unconscious in 
contemporary discourse might be seen as being incorporated into the account of memory: 
implicit, procedural and semantic, discursive memory.  The place of earliest development in 
the construction of mind and personality is recognised even more across disciplines in the 
contemporary scene: the creation of the frame or mental structure – or the implicit, 
procedures of mental functioning.  Is this just a matter of different terminology or is 
something fundamentally different being described?  In Anna Freud’s original model 
pathology arising out of unconscious psychic conflict (the dynamic unconscious) depended 
upon a structural formation that took time to establish.  Her acknowledgement of the 
widening scope of psychoanalysis (A.Freud, 1954) allowed in the consideration of pathology 
arising outside a conceptualisation based on conflict within structural model (Edgecumbe, 
1995).  This revised Profile also allows for the consideration of pathology arising out of 
different developmental stages: deficits in the foundational structures of mind for a variety of 
reasons including biological, and symptoms which arise out of more mature functioning 
where a good enough mental structure has been established. 
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We now ask ourselves if, given the present state of understanding, there are  features which 
should be included, further elaborated or highlighted in a 2015/16 profile?  We owe a debt of 
gratitude to a significant number of researchers on what could be termed the neurobiology of 
intersubjectivity.  The current suggestion is that the mind is built through experience as a 
series of nested hierarchies much like Russian dolls.  On top of the basic biopsychological 
behavioural systems (emotional systems and drives- now seen as more multifarious) 
(Panksepp, 2005) there is a layer of behavioural learning. And then on top of that there is 
thinking and cognition.  This is a hierarchical arrangement that is nested in the sense that the 
bottom layer feeds signals up into the next layer, and that layer feeds down control signals to 
regulate arousal.  This happens again between the behavioural level and the thinking 
cognition level.  This alerts us to the increasingly complex dynamic systems of the mind. 
 
Affective life, the stuff of the child’s subjective experience is inextricably linked to the 
emotional systems and states of arousal as outlined by Panksepp and others.  Arousal, its 
regulation and dysregulation do appear in the Profile in a rather generic way and the notion of 
defences is important.  Could we now link states of anxiety and defence more specifically to 
the particular qualities of emotional interactions with caregivers which would have shaped 
the child’s internal life with consequences for states of hypo or hyper arousal?  This is not 
just to provide a more updated language to describe what is already in the Profile but it shifts 
the developmental emphasis more firmly into realm of the relationships children have with 
their primary caregivers and others.  This emphasises a model of development which is 
located in the crucible of relatedness; where the primary driver is to establish relational 
connectedness facilitating the Russian Doll metaphor (above) with all its potential individual 
idiosycracies.  In this view ‘pathology’ can in part be understood as an adaptation  with 
attendant costs to less than optimal responsiveness  by the parents/caregivers 
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Do we need a more explicit sense of what Emde (2009) has termed ‘we -go’?  In his own 
words ‘we summarized our infancy observations leading to the conclusion that the 
development of autonomy occurs along with development of social connectedness.  It made 
no sense to regard these dimensions  of experience developing separately or sequentially’ (p. 
558).  The revised Profile has put more explicit emphasis on the cultural and social in the 
biopsychosocial tripod and maybe Emde’s formulation is a way of capturing 
psychdynamically a way in which the cultural/social self with all the attendant social 
constructions of, for instance femininity/masculiinity as mediated throught the family etc, can 
be more explicitly highlighted. 
 
The Profile (as previously stated) aims to looks at the child’s own subjectivity but viewed 
from the ‘outside’ maybe the very notion of the ‘subject’ itself can be interrogated and cast in 
a more post modernist light as many recent articles and publications have argued (Butler, 
2008; Lemma & Lynch, 2015). 
 
A common thread is that the ‘story’ of an  identity is not ‘necessarily fixed’ and can be 
unshackled from ‘heteronormativity’ leaving open the possiblibty of adopting a more openly 
enquiring attitude to sexuality in all its manifestations.  This more constructivist approach 
suggests that the narratives about identity are also deeply socially and politically embedded  
in a web of  power relations.  If the ‘subject’ is understood as not in an entrenched fixed 
steady state then could the potential for greater fluidity and shifts also provide a revitalized 
way of thinking about  development, including  psychosexual development. 
 
Empathy as a growing capacity is currently a fascinating area in that research is throwing up 
21 
 
some challenges to the belief that it is definitively, exclusively and invariably linked to the 
quality of early relationships.  It is beyond the scope of a Profile or our knowledge to stray 
into the area of how genetics organise the environment or play out in any given relationship 
but the evidence is mounting that there are callous unemotional children, notwithstanding 
maltreatment, with a marked deficit; vulnerable to not being able to experience empathy.  
Viding and colleagues (Viding, Price, Jaffee, Trzaskowski, Davis, Meaburn, Haworth & 
Plomin, 2013) invite us to consider that qualities of callousness may, in some children, be 
viewed as a  vulnerability not always inextricably linked to environemental factors. Baron 
Cohen in an admittedly populist book, Zero Degrees of Empathy (2011) has made both a 
controversial and compelling case that empathy is a salient overarching feature; a continuum 
along which we can all as individuals be placed.  Narcissistic Personalisty Disorder and 
Borderline Personality Disorder  can all be understood as a difficulty in empathasing.  
Interestingly it is not necessarily tied to Theory of Mind as it is entirely possible to have 
Theory of Mind but little empathy and the converse is equally true.  Where there are 
difficulties in empathizing it may require further consideration as to the ‘impairment’.  Is 
there a a difficulty along the autistic spectrum (AS)?  If the child’s development is not 
suggestive of AS then what else may be at play in the usual complex dynamic between 
maturation, development and environment?  From a different perspective one could also ask 
if there is ‘too much’ empathy at the cost of dissolution of self preservation?  If the quality of 
mercy is strained is it in particular ways and if so which? Some writing on the mirror neurons 
and other systems recruited by them suggest that there is an interesting distinction between 
resonating with someone else’s feeling and then actually making a move to respond to it 
(Eagle, Gallese & Migone, 2009).  The capacity to be in the shoes of another is not only 
developmentally scaffolded through relationships, but like other capacities or agencies may 
entail subtle variations. 
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Finally, the profile as originally conceived by Anna Freud was provisional but nonetheless 
very time consuming and not easily usable in its more exhaustive version in the hard pressed 
environments many clincians now work in.  However, these writers, amongst others, have 
found many ways it can be used fully adapted for specific purposes ranging from assessments 
for the courts, providing a psychodynamic input in a multidisciplinary setting for complex 
developmental disorders through to assessments for psychotherapeutic treatment. 
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